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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE HUGGINS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
N. FREDERICK HICKEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 8497 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This was an action alleging medical malpractice. 
The parties will be designated as they appeared in 
the trial court. 
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, Martin M. Larson, 
Judge. At the close of the evidence, defendant moved for 
a directed verdict, which motion was retained under ad-
visement while the jury considered the case. A verdict 
in favor of plaintiff was returned in the amount of $7,-
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589.00, and the Court, without leaving the bench, set aside 
the verdict and dismissed the action (R. 363). 
The rule asserted by plain tiff at the beginning of 
her brief, that facts should be viewed in the light most 
favorable to her, does not contemplate that the Court 
should be asked to ignore facts against plaintiff or to 
overlook a failure of :proof. Since defendant believes 
both vices are present in plaintiff's brief, defendant has 
prepared a Statement of Fact. 
Care should be exercised in reading the Transcript, 
since it is replete with typographical errors. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is an experienced surgeon, whose profici-
ency in the surgical arts has been recognized by certifi-
cation to membership in the International College of 
Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, and the 
Southwestern Surgical Congress. 
In July, 1954, plaintiff consulted defendant about a 
gall bladder condition. She was then 31 years of age, 
unmarried and an insurance agent by profession. Plain-
tiff's gall bladder was re1noved by the defendant August 
2. 1954, at L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff's complaint was in two counts. The second 
count alleged defendant, during the gall bladder 
operation, without permission, '• ... cut :plaintiff's uterus 
free from an attnehmPnt to her abdominal ·raYity, causing 
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(her) menstrual cycle to increase and become abnormal 
... " (R. 1). The trial court dismissed this count for 
fai1ure of proof at the end of plaintiff's case (R. 275 ). 
Plaintiff has conceded the ruling was correct, and has 
not urged its reversal in this appeal. 
The first count of the complaint alleged defendant 
did not properly attend plaintiff, thereby causing her 
right lung to collapse "subsequent" to the operation. 
(R. 1) It was admitted by plaintiff on trial that the 
operation was successful and that her claim of malprac-
tice was confined to the post-operative ·period. She con-
tended defendant failed to exercise proper skill and 
render proper care while she was still in the hospital and 
that he failed to care for her at all during the week 
she spent at her sister's home in Granger, Utah, prior 
to her departure for Wyoming on August 20, 1954. 
At a pre-trial hearing conducted by the court on 
January 6, 1956, three days before trial, counsel and the 
court agreed, for purposes of this trial, Dr. Hicken 
would be responsible for any breach of accepted medical 
standards ·committed by the doctors who comprised his 
surgical team in the treatment of plaintiff but that, in 
considering whether :plaintiff was afforded proper care, 
in accordance with such standards, he would be entitled 
to the benefit of such professional services as were 
rendered plaintiff hy these doctors. The surgical team 
which treated plaintiff at the hospital consisted of Doc-
tors Hicken, McAllister, Call, Clayton and Buhler. 
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Exhibit 21 is a sheaf of hospital documents com-
prising the original hospital records on plaintiff's case. 
It consists of 29 pages, which are numbered, in ink, in the 
upper right hand corner of each page. Most of the 
pages, although numbered on the front side only, are 
written on both sides. A reference in this brief to a 
page of this exhibit may refer to both sides of the page. 
Pages 20-22 contain a graph, showing pulse rate in red 
ink, and temperature in blue ink. 
The nurses' notes, temperature and respiration 
charts, and comments of ·attending physicians reveal that 
plaintiff's post-operative condition on the afternoon and 
evening of August :2, and through August 3, and most of 
August 4, was essentially satisfactory and apparently as 
to be expected following surgical removal of a gall blad-
der. Plaintiff was under heavy sedation for pain, was 
being feed intravenously and had a Levin tube, with con-
tinuous Ruction, running into her nostril and through her 
throat into her stOinach. She was also catheterized, by 
insertion of a tube in the ureters, at periodic intervals. 
The operative wound was being drained by another tube. 
Plaintiff testified she has no coherent 111emory of any-
thing that occnrrerl for 2·112 rlays following the operation 
and this same information was given to Dr. 'Yilliam 
Rmne], ehPRt specialist, when she consulted him in June, 
19fif) (R. 117). 
At 4 :00 p.m., August 4th, a nurse noted that plain-
tiff's temperature, respiration and pulse rate had risen 
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(Exhibit 21, p. 24). Her color was not good. Her breath 
sounds were abnormal. Remedial measures were com-
menced at once by Dr. Buhler. By 10:00 o'clock that 
evening, breath sounds in the lower right lung were more 
decreased and Dr. McAllister, accompanied by Dr. Clay-
ton, examined her. 
It was Dr. McAllister's clinical impression that plain-
tiff was experiencing the condition known as "atelec-
tasis" (R. 301, Ex. 21, p. 17). This is a medical term 
meaning imperfect expansion of a lung. (Taber's '' Cyclo-
pedic :Medical Dictionary'' Revised 6th Edition, 1954). 
It may involve all, or only part of, the lung (R. 301). In 
plaintiff's case, it apparently involved only the lower 
portion of her right lung, since the four doctors who 
examined her in the evening of August 4, and the morn-
ing of August 5, all reported that the lower lung was 
"dull" and "flat" to percussion (Ex. 21, :pp. 17-18), but 
breath sounds vvere present in the upper portion. 
The prompt treatment, ordered by Dr. Buhler at 5:20 
p.m. August 4th, and followed by Drs. McAllister, Clay-
ton and Call, brought results and by 1:10 a.m. August 
5th, Dr. Clayton found that plaintiff's pulse rate de-
creased 32 points in one hour (Ex. 21, p. 18). 
On the morning of August 5, the anesthesiologist who 
partici1pated in the operation, Dr. Edward Scott, ex-
amined plaintiff and determined that a mucous plug had 
apparently reduced her breath capacity in the right lung. 
He aspirated the 'bronchial tree, causing a cough which 
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freed the plug, and plaintiff's right lung began its return 
to normal expansion. (R. 122, 123). 
Plaintiff's temperature and pulse rate began to 
recede to normal Jevels. Her temperature reached an 
approximate normal reading, by rectal measurement, 
in the late evening of August 5. Earlier that day, at a 
time about 18 hours after the trouble started, the examin-
ing physician found her so much improved that she was 
told to dangle her legs over the bed and to sit in a 
chair. (Ex. 21, p. 18). She was in a chair for 20 minutes 
at 10:00 a.m. August 5, 1954. (Ex. 21, p. 24). 
An X-ray examination of plaintiff's chest was made 
August 6 by the hospital radiologists, Dr. Crowder and 
Dr. Frederick. Their report (Ex. 21, p. 8) revealed "no 
evidence of atelectasis'' and the chest, except for slight 
hypo-aeration due to shallow respiration, was "normal." 
The physicians' progress notes, reflecting their im-
pressions of the plaintiff and their reports of her com-
plaints and attitude, are found on both sides of pages 17 
through 20, Exhibit :21. This source reveals that by the 
evening of August 6, which \Vas 48 hours after plaintiff's 
difficulties began, Dr. Ilea ton, intern, noted that "she 
had no pai11, no subjective complaints" and no short-
ness of breath. (Ex. :21, p. 18). The next day, the breath 
sounds in both lungs wPre equal and on August 8, Dr. 
Call noted that she .. ambulates well and looks good." He 
a]:-;o rPported that plaintiff had ''no complaints at pres-
Pnt." (gx. ~1. p. 19). 
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Plaintiff testified on trial that she was in constant 
pain, of varying intensity, while she was hos'pitalized, 
but the nurses' notes, doctors' progress notes and doc-
tors' orders, as found in Exhibit 21, reveal that her 
complaints gradually diminished,, that some of her pain 
was apparently attributable to gas, since it was relieved 
by enema (for example, see p. 26, Ex. 21); that she 
asked for and received a shampoo on August 10, and 
according to a nurse's note on August 11, was up and 
about at will. 
Plaintiff was discharged about noon August 13. Sh~ 
told the defendant she could not afford hospita:lization 
and that she would convalesce at the home of her sister, 
a registered nurse, residing in Granger, Utah. She was 
instructed to report to Dr. Hicken's office in two days 
for further post-operative care (R. 166). 
From the afternoon of August 13 until her departure 
with her parents for Wyoming on August 20, plaintiff 
was at the home of her sister, either in or on a bed or 
resting on a couch. She had what she described as 
''terrific pain,'' in her right shoulder and chest, just 
as she said she had had in the hospital. She was nause-
ated and could hold nothing on her stomach. She or her 
family talked either to Dr. Hicken or to one of his associ-
ates by telephone on Saturday, August 14, Sunday, Au-
gust 15 and Monday, August 16. On each occasion, medi-
cation was requested, prescribed and received, together· 
with suggestions to relieve the condition. The family 
also had advice from a doctor who was plaintiff's 
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brother-in-law, who "loolmd her over" at the family 
home, according to plaintiff's witness, James Harmon 
(R. 223). 
Plaintiff's sister, Mrs. Harmon, testified she asked 
Dr. Hicken, on August 16, to come to the house, but he 
refused, stating it was too far (R. 242). This was cate-
gorically denied by Dr. Hicken, who stated he \Yas sure 
he had not refused, that if he had, it "would have been 
the first time in my professional career that I have ever 
denied services to any patient." (R. 341). 
On August 17, Dr. McAllister received a phone call 
from a drug store in the Granger area, reporting that 
Dr. Call had been asked to phone a prescription for 
plaintiff for pain and had not done so. Dr. :McAllister 
inquired concerning the condition which required use of 
further drug, and when told plaintiff \Yas von1iting and 
in pain, told the druggiE<t that plaintiff "should be seen 
whether she desired it or whether she didn't'' and that 
he would go to plaintiff, which he did. (R. 295). 
U:pon his arrival at the Hannon hon1e, Dr. lfcAllister 
examined plaintiff, on a couch in the living room. Her 
bowel sounds were normal, and nothing was noted by 
palpation. Pulse and heart action were normal. Lungs 
wPre examined h~· stethoscope and by percussion, with-
out abnonnality being found, and the doc.tor \Yas unable 
to Pxplnin either hPr pain or her nan~ea. (R. 296). 
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Dr. McAllister testified he wanted plaintiff to go 
back to the hos1>ital, where she could get intravenous 
feeding, because h,e was afraid she would become dehy-
drated from vomiting. He recommended she return, 
whether she could afford it or not, and told her he was 
sure some ''arrangement could be made" concerning the 
cost. (R. 298). Plaintiff finally admitted, on cross-exami-
nation, that Dr. McAllister had recommended that she go 
back to the hospital, but she did not go. (R. 169, 255). 
Dr. McAllister, on the occasion of his visit, finally 
agreed to leave more pain medication, but told plaintiff 
and her sister they must either come to the office or to 
the hos:pital the next day - "otherwise, don't call me 
any more for pain medicine." (R. 298) His recommenda-
tion was not followed. 
Plaintiff continued to have pain and nausea the 
next day, Wednesday, and on Thursday. On Friday, 
August 20, her parents arrived to take her to her home 
in Rawlins, Wyoming, and they drove her to the out-
patient entrance to L.D.S. Hos:pital. Maude Huggins, 
plaintiff's mother, of Rawlins, Wyoming, testified that 
she and her husband prepared the back seat of the car 
in a comfortable fashion for plaintiff to make the ride 
to Wyoming, and before they started out on the trip, a 
call was made to the hospital to see if the doctor "could 
give her some pills or something to help her ,pain to see 
if we eould get her home." (R. 231). Plaintiff's testi-
mony was in accord. (R. 137, 138). 
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Dr. Hicken came to the out-patient department to 
see plaintiff. At his direction, the requested pain-killing 
drug was given her. He testified he told plaintiff and her 
parents that if "this thing was bothering her so much as 
she said, why didn't she come in and go to the hospital 
... 1" (R. 342) This evidence was not contradicted by 
.plaintiff, although it constituted the third recommenda-
tion by defendant or his associates, in the period follow-
ing her discharge from the hospital, that she should be 
hospitalized. (R. 342, 136, 169, 255). 
On direct examination, plaintiff testified that it was 
on August 20, 1954 that she no longer considered her-
self under Dr. Hicken's care. (R. 139). 
Plaintiff produced testimony from Alta Huggins, 
from her mother and from herself to show she was hos-
pitalized in Rawlins, \Vyoming, the day after she arrived 
there and that she remained in the hospital 33 days. 
X-rays were taken in that hos~pital beginning August 23, 
and were introduced in evidence through the testimony 
of Henry Arnold, X-ray technician who was brought here 
to testify ( R. 268, et seq.). 
The \Vyoming X-ray films, constituting exhibits 7 
through 16, were never interpreted for the jury. On the 
afternoon of the first day of trial, counsel for plaintiff, 
"·hHe Dr. Rumel wa~ under direct exa~nination as plain-
tiff'~ thirrl witneRR, informed the court he desired to 
n~k tlw doctor certain questions in the absence of the 
jnr~~ (R. 97). The jnry wa~ thereupon excused for tlw 
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day and Dr. Rumel was questioned regarding standards 
of medical care, and was then asked to examine and 
explain the medical significance of X-ray exhibits 7 
through 16 (R. 101, et seq.). Plaintiff did not recall Dr. 
Rumel for such testimony in the presence of the jury, nor 
did plaintiff ask to have his testimony read or stipulated, 
and the case went to the jury as if the testimony ha(l 
never been given. 
To establish a standard of medical treatment, to 
which plaintiff claimed defendant did not conform, plain-
tiff relied principal~ly upon the testimony of defendant, 
who was called as an adverse party (R. 38, et seq.), and 
the testimony of Alta Huggins, plaintiff's cousin, who 
was a nurse in training in August, 1954, and a registered 
nurse at time of trial (R. 181). Alta's testimony concern-
ing medical and nursing practice and procedure begins 
at page 203 in the record. 
By these witnesses, it was shown that the prevailing 
practice in this community in August, 1954, required, 
among other things, that a patient who had undergone 
gall bladder surgery, was encouraged to cough, to take 
deep breaths, and was turned, all at intervals of two 
hours. The purpose of such treatment was to prevent, if 
possible, the "onset of atelectasis" (R. 39). Dr. Hicken 
said that there were "standing rules" at L.D.S. Hospital 
for such treatment (R. 39). Alta Huggins agreed, stating, 
when asked if such treatment was "common, routine 
and proper," "I know it is." (R. 216). She stated that 
nurses, of course, did not treat patients without orders 
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from the doctor (R. 220), but that when the doctor 
ordered coughing, turning, deep breathing and other ex-
pected post-operative care, the nurses were trained to 
give these and other treatments at two-hour intervals, 
and somethimes more often (R. 205). 
She admitted that such orders were given by Dr. 
Hicken in this case (R. 216). This, of course, was undis-
puted, since the orders are found in Exhibit 21, p. 9. 
Alta Huggins spent a great deal of time by plain-
tiff's bedside. It was she who first noticed that plain-
tiff's condition had deteriorated on the afternoon of 
August 4, which was 48 hours after surgery, and she at 
once reported this fact to the nurse on duty (R. 188). 
Dr. Buhler came and commenced the remedial measures 
with the results previously described. 
Concerning the standard of care of a patient in the 
hospital in post-operative days, after the first orders are 
given, evidence was received from Alta Huggins and Dr. 
Hicken, who agreed, in substance, that if the patient 
appears to be progressing satisfactorily, the doctor's 
orders would not be changed (R. 126). However, should 
her temperature and pulse rate rise ''above their ex-
pected limits,·' the treatment then to be followed would 
depend upon the nature or extent of the increase in tem-
perature and pulse rate (R. 49). 
Plaintiff's pulse rate rose sharply 1n the 36-hour 
pPriod aftPr the operation, and then decreased. Her 
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temperature rose also, but not as much, comparatively, 
as did her pulse (Ex. 21, p. 20). Her temperature, in that 
period, rose to 101.6 degrees by rectum which would 
be 100.6 degrees orally, since rectal te,mperatures are 
one degree higher than oral (R. 312). Forty hours after 
surgery, her temperature had returned to normal. 
During this period, the original orders for the irn-
mediate post-operative care of the patient were supple-
mented by additional orders from four different doctor~ 
(Ex. 21, p. 9, 10). There was no evidence that these 
supplemental orders were medically improper or insuf-
ficient under the .prevailing standards of ·care. 
Whether the rises in te·mperature and puls·e were 
higher than was to have been expected in gall bladder 
surgery was never shown by any testimony. The infer-
ence to be drawn from the hospital records, however, is 
that the increases apparently were not unexpect·ed, since 
Exhibit 21 reveals that plaintiff's progress in this period 
"·as observed and noted in the record by Doctors Hicken, 
McAHister, Call, Clayton and Buhler, and by Nurs-es 
Briggs, Bromfield, Cordey, Thompson, Christensen, Han-
sen, Paulsen and Webb, none of whom made any entry 
on any record indicating alarm or dissatisfaction with 
plaintiff's recovery. 
With reference to plaintiff's contention that defend-
ant was negligent in the care of plaintiff following her 
trouble on August 4th and 5th, in that he did not order 
additional X-ray of her chest, it will be recalled that an 
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X-ray of the chest was ordered on the morning of Au-
gust 6. The chest was normal. Plaintiff contends that 
additional X-rays should have been obtained during the 
next week, although there was no evidence that good 
practice required additional X-rays or that plaintiff's 
subjective or objective symptoms were of such a nature 
that further use of X-ray was indicated by good medical 
practice. 
With regard to plaintiff's final claim of negligence, 
which was to the effect that defendant "failed to give 
the proper care and attention" (Brief, p. 21) which 
plaintiff's condition required while she was at her sister's 
home, the record concededly contains no evidence of what 
care and attention would have been proper. The record 
reveals that there were telephone consultations with one 
or more of the doctors on each day for the 6-day period, 
and that Dr. McAllister visited and examined plaintiff on 
the evening of the 4th day. There was no evidence that 
this was insufficient or that plaintiff suffered injury 
or damage she would not have experienced otherwise. 
At the close of plaintiff's evidence and again at the 
close of all the evidence, defendant n1oved the court for 
a directed verdict. The n1otions were considered by the 
court while the jury deliberated. Following return of a 
verdirt in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court reported 
that he had carefully reviewed the record while the jury 
was deliberating. From that examination he concluded 
that he ronld '' ... finrl no PvirlPnce in the record from 
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which the jury could find that the plaintiff's pain in her 
chest and troubles, had any relationship to any act, or 
lack of action on the part of Dr. Hicken ... '' 
The court thereupon set aside the jury's verdict, 
granted the motions by the defendant and dismissed the 
action. Plaintiff did not file a motion for new trial, but 
appealed directly to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFEND_ 
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND SET 
ASIDE THE VERDICT, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW EITHER NEGLIGENCE, THE 
NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S AILMENT, OR ANY CAUSAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFEND_ 
ANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND SET 
ASIDE THE VERDICT, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW EITHER NEGLIGENCE, THE 
NATURE OF PLAINTIFF'S AILMENT, OR ANY CAUSAL 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM. 
Since plaintiff's claim of ne~ligence has been divided 
by her in her brief into two periods, the first consisting 
of the period <from the time of surgery until hos,pital 
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discharge, and the second from hospital discharge until 
her departure from Utah seven days later, her claim 
will be discussed in the same division, and in the same· 
order. 
I-IOSPITALIZATION FOLLOWING SURGERY: 
This period of time extends from the conclusion 
of surgery at 3 :25 p.m. August 2, 1954 to plaintiff's dis~ 
charge at noon, August 13, 1954. Plaintiff first contends 
that during the period immediately following surgery, 
the standard of medical care prevailing in this com-
munity and the routine procedure at L.D.S. Hospital 
required that the plaintiff be coughed, turned and en-
couraged to breathe deeply at two hour intervals. Plain-
tiff next contends, through the testimony of her cousin, 
Alta Huggins, and by reference to the hospital chart, 
that plaintiff did not receive this treatment. 
However, it is undisputed that following surgery, 
seven post-operative orders were issued for the treat-
ment of this patient, including the order to "turn, cough 
and encourage deep breathing and leg exercises." (Ex-
hibit 21, p. 9). Alta Huggins conceded that such orders 
were given and were proper. It is therefore clear that 
this standard of n1edical care was followed by defendant 
and his responsibilit~· to issue proper orders "·as fully 
discharged. 
lf plaintiff did not receive the treatment contem-
plated h~· the standard and by the rnle~ of the hospital, 
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such failure was the res:ponsibility of hospital personnel, 
and could not be attributable to the defendant, unless and 
until some fact occurred which, in the exercise of proper 
professional practice, should have put him on notice that 
his orders were not being followed, and he thereafter 
failed to remedy the situation. 
Plaintiff has admitted that this is the law. The 
court so instructed the jury, by its instruction No. 19. 
Plaintiff did not except to this instruction and, under 
familiar doctrine, the principle is the law of this case. 
It is also the law generally. The rule is well stated by 
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in Hohenthal vs. Smith (1940), 114 
Fed. 2nd, 494, where it is said: 
". . . where employees of the hospital are 
negligent in carrying out the surgeon's instruc-
tions as to treatment after the operation, the 
overwhelming weight of authority holds that the 
. surgeon is not liable in the absence of a showing 
that he was negligent in giving the instructions or 
selecting the persons to carry them out, that he 
was present and could have avoided the injury 
by exercising due care, or that his special contract 
relative to the negligent employee was such as to 
make the doctrine of respondant superior appli-
cable .... Part of the service furnished to the 
patient and charged for by the hospital is the 
assistance of nurses, interns and attendants in 
caring for the patient after the operation pursu-
ant to instructions given by the operating surgeon. 
They perform the duty of their employer (the 
hospital) to the patient when they carry out the 
instructions of the doctor .... '' 
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Plaintiff, however, asserts that if defendant had 
conformed to accepted medical standards, he would have 
observed facts which would have put him on notice that 
his orders were not being followed by hospital personnel. 
In support of this contention, it is claimed that plaintiff's 
temperature and pulse rate increased during the night 
following surgery, and on the next day, to such an extent 
that defendant ought to have known, as a competent 
surgeon, that his orders were not being followed, or that 
his orders were insufficient. 
The difficulty with this contention, however, is that 
there was no evidence that the increase in temperature 
and pulse was more than was to have been medically ex-
pected in the first hours following surgical treatment 
of cholecystitis, which is the medical term for plaintiff's 
illness . 
.Jforeover, plaintiff's repeated assertion that plain-
tiff was not ''turned,'' because that word appears infre-
quently upon the nurses' notes, ,,~hich she asserts should 
have :put the doctor on notice that his orders were being 
ignored, is completely refuted by other portions of the 
hospital record and the record of this trial. It is undis-
puted plaintiff "·af' receiving repeated injections for 
pain, which were of the t~·pe that are given in the but-
tocks, whirh requireR turning on one side or the other 
(R. 328). Further, it was not disputed, and, in fact, it 
is known by any person ,,·ho has E'YE'r been hospitalized, 
that when a patient i~ ''made eon1fortahle," or given 
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"routine care," or given a "bed bath," that the patient 
is moved so that soothing lotions may be rubbed on the 
back, that bed linen is smoothed or changed or that bed 
clothes are changed (R. :217, 328). 
It is further within common knowledge, and cer-
tainly within the knowledge of the doctors on a case, that 
when a patient is in pain, she will not remain absolutely 
still, as plaintiff seems to imply, but will turn and 
change her :position of her own volition. Dr. Hicken so 
testified ( R. 43). 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief, page 20, that she was 
''turned'' only four times in 43 hours, but the record 
shows that she was either turned, given a bed bath, 
given medication for pain, made comfortable, given rou-
tine care, catheterized, or received a rectal tube, on lS 
occasions in that period, or an average of more than once 
each 2112 hours, not including examination by doctors 
(Ex. 21, pp. 23, 24) . 
It is, therefore, clear that plaintiff's claim that she 
was ''turned'' only when that word appeared on the 
hospital record, constitutes an unreasonable, improbable 
and improper inference from the facts in this record. 
The trial judge noted this defect in plaintiff's case at the 
time of his decision. (R. 363). 
On the morning of August 3rd, the first post-opera-
tive day, Dr. McAllister noted she was "doing well." The 
next morning, her temperature was normal. Dr. Hicken 
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testified he was of the opinion that his orders were being 
carried out. No doctor ever testified that conformance 
to medical standards would have required Dr. Hicken to 
reach a different conclusion, under these circumstances. 
There is, therefore, no showing that a competent 
doctor, conforming to medically accepted standards of 
treatment in post-operative gall bladder cases, would 
have been placed on notice that his orders were being 
ignored, or that such a doctor would have done more than 
the defendant did. 
Beyond this, however, is the fact that there is ab-
solutely no basis to be found in this record for the asser-
tion by plaintiff, in her brief at page 20, paragraph num-
bered 2, that defendant failed to observe the elevation 
of pulse and temperature, or having noted them, failed 
to take remedial measures. The record shows, in Exhibit 
21, pages 9 and 10, that the original doctor's orders were 
supplemented during this period by eight additional 
orders, entered in ·writing by four separate doctors. 
These new orders directed the adn1inistration of certain 
fluids, drugs and chemical compounds, together with the 
use of such apparatus a:;; was required to facilitate their 
application. Plaintiff has not only failed to mention these 
orders, but failed to show, on trial, that they were 
improper or insufficient under prevailing medical stand-
ards of treatment for such conditions. 
On this phase of the case, therefore, plaintiff did not 
uphold her burden of proof. which required her. under 
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long-established doctrine, to produce facts tending 
'' affinnatively to show that the defendant ... did not 
exercise such reasonable care, skill and diligence as 
ordinarily is exercised . . . '' by skilled surgeons in Salt 
Lake City in the treatment of such cases. Baxter vs. 
Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2nd 257. 
Plaintiff has apparently now abandoned any claim 
that defendant or the hospital were negligent in the treat-
ment of her extraordinary complications which appeared 
on the afternoon of August 4th. Her reason is clear, for 
the hospital chart (Exhibit 21) reveals that during the 
course of this treatment, and extending through the 
morning of August 6th, there were recorded 52 visits 
by nurses, and examinations or treatments by 8 separate 
doctors. 
The next assertion of negligence relates to the period 
frmn August 6th to the date of discharge on August 13th. 
Plaintiff contends that, during that week, her symptoms 
of pain in the chest, rise and fall in temperature, and 
continued requirements of heavy sedation for pain, all 
indicated the need for further X-ray examination. Again, 
however, no evidence was offered or received that such 
symptoms as plaintiff displayed in this period would 
have required, under prevalent medical standards, that a 
competent physician undertake additional X-ray exami-
nation. Plaintiff impliedly recognizes this defect in her 
case by asserting in her brief that X-ray is such an 
accepted method of diagnosis that the need for its use 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
need not be established by expert evidence. The cases 
cited in support of this proposition contain correct princi-
ples of law in view of the facts in such cases. However, 
no case comparable to the present case has been cited 
in plaintiff's brief. While X-ray is of obvious assistance 
in many cases, such as in detecting the nature and extent 
of fractures, or the presence of foreign objects and 
tumorous masses, it cannot be said to be a matter of com-
mon knowledge or judicial notice that good medical pra~ 
tice requires a surgeon to use X-ray because his patient 
complains of pains after major surgery. 
It must also be kept in mind that an X-ray was 
taken by a competent specialist in radiology on August 
6, 1954, and had been interpreted by him as essentially 
normal. The record further shows without contradiction 
that the X-ray films were examined by Drs. Hicken and 
McAllister and that they concurred in the interpretation 
of the radiologist, Dr. Frederick. 
Plaintiff's contention seems to be that one X-ray 
was not enough, and that defendant ought to be liable be-
cause he did not obtain more than one. A similar conten-
tion, in a fracture case in Idaho, was rejected by th~ 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Moore vs. 
Tremelling (1935) 78 Fed. 2nd 821, w·here, as here, no 
evidence was .produced by plaintiff that local medical 
Rtandards required more than one X-ray. "\Vithout such 
evidence, the Court said, there is '' ... no proof that 
tlu=- appellant did not exereise sneh professional skill and 
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In Boyce vs. Brown (Arizona, 1938), 77 Pac. 2nd 455, 
plaintiff urged that it was negligence to fail to take an 
X-ray of an ankle, many years after the defendant had re-
duced a fracture by surgical open reduction. Plaintiff 
said such failure was "such obvious negligence that even 
a layman knows it to be a departure from a proper stand-
ard.'' The Arizona Supreme Court did not agree, 
stating: 
"It is true that most laymen know that the 
X-ray usually offers the best method of diagnos-
ing physical changes of the interior organs of the 
body, and particularly of the skeleton, short of an 
actual opening of the body for ocular examina-
tion, but laymen cannot say that in all cases 
where there is some trouble with the internal 
organs that it is a departure from standard 
medical practice to fail to take an X-ray.'' 
Since plaintiff did not produce evidence from a com-
petent medical practitioner that additional X-ray was 
required in order to conform to accepted practice, the 
jury should not have been allowed to speculate and 
should not have been allowed to substitute, in retrospect, 
its untrained and lay judgment for the training and 
experience of a qualified doctor, familiar with medical 
standards of care in this community. 
CO~V ALE SCENT PERIOD AFTER 
HOSPITAL DISCHARGE: 
Plaintiff's final contention IS that in the six day 
period follmving her discharge, while she was in con-
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valescence at the home of her sister in Granger, Utah, 
Dr. Hicken failed "to apprise himself of or discover the 
seriousness of" plaintiff's "lung complications." Plain-
tiff in effect alleges a form of abandonment of his pa-
tient by the defendant. Plaintiff's proof, however, fails 
to support this charge in that there was no proof to 
show what defendant should have done that he did not 
do, except that plaintiff contends he should have visited 
her on August 16, 1954, when her sister requested him 
to come. 
Plaintiff failed to establish by any medical evidence 
whatsoever that the daily telephone consultations with 
the defendant, or with one or more of his associates, 
and Dr. McAllister's visit and examination on August 
17th, were insufficient for the defendant to apprise 
himself of plaintiff'~ condition. 
The United State~ Court of A:ppeals for the District 
of Columbia, in a leading case decided in 1948, was 
confronted with the same plea by a plaintiff who alleged 
that the defendant doctor had failed to inform himself 
as to the condition of his patient, and had failed to call 
upon her "·hen asked to do ~o. Jn~tiee Stephens, speak-
ing for the Court, rulerl: 
'' ... it is not shown that such daily examina-. 
tion was required in the exercise of proper pro-
fessional care. ~or is it shown that Dr. Lawson 
could not properly, in view of the nature of the 
ailment, inform himself. as he did ... through 
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frequent telephoned reports of Mrs. Rodgers' con-
dition after she returned home ... '' 
The Court held that the case, which involved care of a 
postnatal breast condition, involved 
'' ... a question of the merits of a diagnosis anJ 
scientific treatment. This cannot be determined 
by a lay jury without the aid of expert opin-
. " lOll ••• 
Finally the Court rejected the argument, which is also 
made in the case at bar by plaintiff, that the presence 
of pain required the doctor to act. Proof of pain for 
an extended period, without more, does not evidence 
neglect, according to the Court, and there was no evi-
dence that due professional care required the administra-
tion of sedatives. Rodgers vs. Lawson (1948) D. C., 170 
Fed. 2nd 157. 
Further, plaintiff has completely failed to show, as 
we believe is required in a case of alleged abandonment, 
that the results which the plaintiff encountered were 
otherwise than would have been the case if the alleged 
abandonment had not occurred. This :principle was re-
cently affirmed by this Court in stating the proof which 
should have been made by a plaintiff in a case of alleged 
abandonment. Spendlove vs. Georges, 4 Utah 2nd 393, 
295 P. 2nd 336. 
Beyond this, however, is another glaring weakness 
in plaintiff's case---a weakness recognized by the trial 
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,court when· he dismissed the action ( R. a61). Even if 
there had been competent evidence of the medical stand-
ards which defendant is alleged to have breached, there 
was no evidence upon which a jury could properly find a 
causal relationship between the breach and plaintiff's 
ultimate physical condition. 
A jury should not be allowed to speculate that an 
unidentified physical ailm·ent proximately resulted from 
the doctor not having done more than he did in his treat-
ment. This principle has been recognized by this Court 
re:peatedly. 
In Anderson vs. Nixon (l943), 104 Utah 262, 139 P. 
(2d) 216, the patient had dev-eloped osteomyelitis and he 
alleged that the defendant doctor negligently failed to 
recognize that condition and negligently failed to treat 
him for it properly, in that he should have ordered blood 
transfusions. Under the evidence this Court held that 
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to consider on 
the question of ''Thether or not the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to apprise hin1self of the plaintiff's con-
dition by the use of available blood tests. 
However, on the question of the causal relationship 
between this failure and the end result, the Court stated: 
''There was no expert evidence in this case 
that if defendant had done these things at that 
time the condition which caused the eventual am-
putation of plaintiff's leg could have been 
avoided. Osteomyt>liti~ being a disease the cause 
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and cure of which is peculiarly within the knowl~ 
edge of medical men and not a matter of common 
knowledge, it is necessary to have expert testi-
mony on the effect of the negligence of a doctor 
on the end result .... In the absence of such expert 
testimony there is nothing upon which a jury can 
base its finding on the proximate cause of the 
injury. A jury may not conjecture or speculate, 
but must have substantial evidence upon which to 
base a verdict." 
To the same effect are both earlier and later Utah 
cases. Edwards vs. Cla.rk (1938), 96 Utah 121, 83 P. (2d) 
1021; Jackspn vs. Colston (1949), 116 Utah 295, 209 P. 
(2d) 566. 
The principle announced in these cases should be 
even more forcefully applied where, as in the present 
case, plaintiff has not only failed to show causation, but 
has failed to establish or define, except by vague gen-
eralities, the injury which allegedly resulted. 
Plaintiff describes her ultimate condition as "lung 
complications.'' That this term may encompass any one 
or more of a vast number of ailments of the human 
breathing apparatus is so obvious as to require no cita-
tion of authority, either medical or legal. That such ail-
ments may result from a multitude of causes, eithe:· 
singly or in combination, is equally clear. 
The only evidence offered to aid the jury 1n de-
termining what had occurred after plaintiff left Utah 
consisted of testimony from plaintiff and her family of 
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her pain, her nausea, and her hospitalization in Wy-
oming, together with X-ray films which were introduced 
in evidence by the testimony of the technician who oper-
ated the X-ray machine in the Wyoming hospital and who 
was brought here to testify. Although plaintiff said she 
was treated by two physicians in Wyoming, neither was 
brought here to testify nor was there any attempt to 
obtain the testimony of these, or any other doctors, either 
by oral deposition or written interrogatories. 
The X-ray films from Wyoming, although in court 
during most of the trial, were never interpreted for the 
jury, even though at one time or another five physicians 
were present in court, subject to call. Thus the jury was 
allowed to interpret X-rays and to base a verdict, in part, 
upon its untrained observation of X-ray films, when it is 
a matter of common knowledge that even medical men 
often have difficulty in interpreting such films despite 
their training and experience. 
An example of this difficulty is found in that portion 
of Dr. Rumel's testimony which was presented to the 
jury. He was shown two X-ray films of plaintiff's spinal 
area. But, despite his obvious ability to interpret X-rays, 
he declined to eomment upon the films handed him, 
stat_ing: 
''I'm supposed to know about chests. These 
are spine tones .... ''I 'n1 not supposed to know 
about that. ... I don't pretend to know that.'· 
(R. 90, 91). 
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The only "aid "afforded the jury in understanding 
the X-rays was upon final argument of plaintiff's coun-
sel, who placed some of the films in the view box and· 
attempted to interpret them to the jury. He claimed that 
they showed damage and deterioration of the lung,. and 
that the condition obviously resulted from defendant's 
lack of care. 
Counsel, of course, did not go so far as to claim that 
his argument constituted evidence or that he was a 
medical expert on lung conditions or their caThSes. How-
ever, since there was no proof, his statement of cause 
and effect may have impressed the jury of laymen as 
being at least logically correct. 
Members of the jury, it will be recalled, were not 
permitted to hear Dr. Rumel's testimony that the lung 
condition :portrayed in the Wyoming X-rays can result 
in ''an hour or two,'' from a number of different causes, 
of which an embolus, or blood clot, would be ''statistically 
the most common" (R. 11~, 113). 
From what has been said regarding proof of ·events 
following plaintiff's discharge from L.D.S. Hospital, it 
is clear she did not prove a medical standard or a de-
parture therefrom, did not prove the nature of the injury 
she allegedly suffered and did not prove that any other 
result would have been reached had the defendant done 
more, or other, than he did. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant believes it clear that no judge, and par-
ticularly a judge with long experience on the bench and 
at the bar, lightly sets aside a substantial verdict which 
has been awarded to plaintiff only moments earlier. 
When such a verdict is r·eversed, it is because the trial 
court finds that his duty compelled the act. 
We earnestly contend that upon the written record 
only in this case, a record which reveals neither negli-
gence nor proximate cause, the trial court was required 
to dismiss this action as a matter of law. 
His judgment, based not only upon the written rec-
ord, but upon his personal observation of the witnesses 
and all other factors in the trial, factors which are never 
discernible on the printed page, was sound, both in princi-
ple and in precedent and such judgment ought to be af-
firmed by this court. 
---------0--------
Should the Supre1ne Court reject the foregoing argu-
ment and find it neces.sary to reverse the order of the 
trial court, defendant urges that the verdict ought not to 
be reinstated and judgment entered thereon, because de-
fendant believes he is entitled in such eYent, as a matter 
of law, to a new trial, and in support of such contention, 
defendant relies upon the following additional Staten1ent 
of Points, which he asks that the Supreme Court consider 
if, and only if, the Court finds it necessary to reverse the 
ord<'r of tlw trial court. 
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUB-
STANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN 
ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY NUMBERED 6, 7, 10, 
11, 14, 17 AND 18. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUB-
STANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS NUMBERED 1, 3, 8, 15, 
17 and 19. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR SUB-
STANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN 
RECEIVING EVIDENCE R E G A R D I N G PLAINTIFF'S 
PHYSICAL CONDITION, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
AFFORDED HER IN THE STATE OF WYOMING FOLLOW-
ING AUGUST 20, 1954, AND RELATING TO HER PHYSICAL 
CONDITION SINCE HER RETURN FROM WYOMING, BE-
CAUSE NONE OF SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRECEDED BY 
A PROPER FOUNDATION SHOWING A CAUSAL RE-




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUB-
STANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN 
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ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY NUMBERED 6, 7, 10, 
11, 14, 17 AND 18. 
The instructions given the jury by the trial court 
were inadvertently omitted by the clerk of the lower 
court at the time the record was transmitted to the 
Supreme Court, and were forwarded under separate 
certificate dated August 7, 1956. The instructions are 
therefore not serially numbered with the remainder of 
the record, and must be examined by number. 
Instruction 6 is a ''stock'' instruction relating to 
the terms "negligence," "ordinary care" and "proxi-
mate cause." It is believed to be objectionable in a 
case of alleged medical malpractice, which is essentially 
a specialized branch of the law of negligence. It allowed 
the jury to consider the standard of the ''reasonably pru-
dent person,'' and stated: 
''The duty is dictated and measured by the 
exigencies of the occasion. '' 
Instruction 7 carried this san1e thought forward, and 
applied it to this case stating that the jury could find 
the defendant liable if it determined: 
'' ... that he was careless or negligent in caring 
for the plain tiff. . . . " 
This is not the test in medical negligence cases. The 
true n1easure is whether there was exercised "that 
degree of care and skill considered proper by correct 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
and accepted standards of the profession .... " Forrest 
vs. Eason (Utah, 1953), 261 P. (2d) 178. 
The trial court, of course, recognized this rule, and 
informed the jury, in its Instruction 17, that it was re-
quired to consider what the medical standard was when 
it determined ''whether the defendant and the other 
doctors associated with him properly fulfilled the dutie8 
imposed upon them .... " This, however, was near the 
end of the instructions, and long after the jury had been 
told they could find defendant liable if he disregarded 
ordinary prudence. Further, this instruction contained 
the first reference to ''other doctors associated with'' 
defendant, and the jury may well have considered this 
not to be a modification of the earlier instructions which 
related to the defendant alone. 
Instruction 17 further did not cure the error in the 
earlier instructions, because it did not properly tell the 
jury how the medical standard of care should have been 
proven. It allowed the jury to determine the standard 
"through evidence presented in this trial as to such 
standards and practices.'' Now here was the jury told 
that the evidence must have been presented by medical 
experts and since plaintiff relied heavily upon the testi-
mony of her cousin, Alta Huggins, a student nurse at 
L.D.S. Hospital, to discuss hospital and medical practice, 
it seems clear that the jury was allowed to consider other 
than medical evidence in determining the medical 
standard. 
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This constituted prejudicial error. This was a case 
involving the detennination of the care which ought to 
be given, post-operatively, to a person with the disease of 
cholecystitis. As such, the general rule announced by this 
Court in Fredrickson vs. Maw (1951), 227 P. (2d) 772, 
should govern. The Court said: 
'' ... in those cases which depend upon knowledge 
of the scientific effect of medicine, the results of 
surgery ... whether the attending physician exer-
cised the ordinary care, skill and knowledge re-
quired of doctors in the community which he 
serves, must ordinarily be established by the testi-
mony of physicians. There is, however, another 
well-recognized rule holding that when facts may 
be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses 
of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert 
testimony be produced and relied upon.'' 
This is obviously not a case where "facts may be 
ascertained by ordinary use of the senses of lay wit-
nesses.'' As the Court stated, .such ca~es are usually the 
so-called ''sponge'' cases, where an object, foreign to the 
body, is left ·within it. 'Ve have found no ease, and plain-
tiff has cited none, where the "sponge case rule" has 
been extended to embrace facts such as were before the 
Conrt in this case. 
It is no answer to the foregoing to say that the trial 
court corrected its errors regarding the medical standard 
hy its Instruction 18, which further explained the test to 
he applied by the jnr~·. The test, said the court, was 
whf'th0r the plaintiff "wa~ treated \Yith the sa1ne 
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methods, skill and care ordinarily used in like cases by 
surgeons in hospitals in the neighborhood, and given 
the attention and treatment usually and ordinarily given 
to such patient by nurses and attendants." (Italics 
supplied). 
This instruction not only did not mention the re-
quirement that the evidence of the standard must come 
from medical testimony, but allowed the jury to believe 
that the defendant was responsible for the care given 
by nurses and attendants, which, as has been pointed out 
earlier in this brief, is not the law generally, nor the law 
of this case, and was directly contradictory with the 
court's instruction 19. 
Under Instruction 18, since there were two tests 
given the jury to consider, and since they were stated 
conjunctively, the jury could find that unless the plain-
tiff was treated with the same methods, skill and care 
ordinarily used in like cases by surgeons in this vicinity 
and also received care from nurses and attendants 
ordinarily given such patients, the defendant would be 
liable. Thus, if the jury found that either test was not 
met, it was told defendant would be liable, yet the re-
sponsibility of hospital care was clearly not his if he 
gave proper orders, which he did, and if nothing occurred 
to :put him on notice they were not being followed. 
Defendant contends Instructions 10 and 11 were im-
proper in a_ number of particulars. Instruction 10 pur-
ports to inform the jury of the plaintiff's claim of negli-
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gence, and submits, for jury consideration, elements of 
the claim which were not supported by any substantial 
evidence. Instruction 11 informed the jury what its ver-
dict should be if the elements in No. 10 were proved. 
Since Instruction 10 is divided into paragraphs 
designated (a) through (e) the objectionable portions 
will be discussed under similar headings. 
lO(a): This paragraph advised the jury ·Of the claim 
that "defendant failed and neglected to visit plaintiff 
and examine her condition as frequently as was the 
standard ... " of surgeons in Salt Lake City in similar 
cases. From what has been said in the earlier portions of 
this brief, it is clear that there was no evidence of any 
kind as to such standard. Defendant, when called as an 
advers·e witness for the purpose of establishing a medical 
standard, was never even asked about the ''frequency of 
visits or examinations,'' nor was any other doctor. 
In addition, this portion of the instruction was 
limited to the defendant alone, although it was clear that 
defendant's associate doctors should have been men-
tioned, as they were later, in Instruction 17. 
lO(b): Here, the jury "~as told of the claim that 
defendant had failed to issue proper orders and direC-
tions to the nurses. This should not have been submitted 
to the jury, in view of the undisputed evidence that such 
orders were, in fact, p;iYen in1mediately follo·wing surgery 
anrl in view of the further fact that there was never any 
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evidence that the additional orders, in the days that fol-
lowed, were improper or insufficient under the prevail-
ing standard of care, or that the orders which were given 
were improper. 
lO(c): This stated that plaintiff claimed that de-
fendant "did not see that the nurses and attendants 
obeyed and fulfilled his orders." H,e was not required 
to take such action, unless and until some fact occurred 
which put him on notice that his orders were not being 
obeyed or fulfilled. The jury should have been so told, 
in this instruction, because, in Instruction 11, the court 
stated that if plaintiff had proved the matters set forth 
in the sub-:paragraphs of Instruction 10, they should find 
for plaintiff. Hence, it is natural they would look only 
to No. 10 and not feel required to search through the en-
tire set of twenty- five instructions to see if the formula 
given them in Instructions 10 and 11 was modified. 
lO(d) and (e): By these paragraphs, the jury was 
advised that plaintiff claimed she developed and suffered 
a collapsed lung as a result of neglect .of the defendant, 
and that she endured physical and mental pain and suf-
fering and was impaired in body, as a result of the col-
lapsed lung. As has been pointed out repeatedly in this 
brief, there was no substantial evidence to this effect, 
and it is fundamental that a question should not be sub-
mitted for jury consideration unless it is supported by 
'tluch evidence. 
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Finally, defendant asserts that while the instruc-
tions, as a whole, contain many correct statements of the 
principles of law involved, the jury could not have 
applied them as the court intended them to be appliea, 
in view of the flat statement by the Court, in Instruction 
11, that if the elements set forth in the sub-paragraphs 
of Instruction 10 were proved, the jury's verdict ''should 
be in favor of plaintiff ... , and you must assess plain-
tiff's damage.'' 
It is unlikely that any jury, regardless of the merits 
of the instructions as a whole, would overlook the oppor-
tunity presented by such a peremptory formula for de-
cision. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR, SUB-
STANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN 
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS NUMBERED 1, 3, 8, 15, 
17 and 19. 
Defendant has already stated, in the main argument 
in this brief, his reasons why he believes the court should 
have instructed the jury in accordance with defendant's 
Request No. 1, whirh was a request for directed verdict. 
Defendant's request No. 3 "·as given in part by the 
Court in its Instruction 19, but the court omitted the 
nJ.ost important part of the request, which was to the 
pff<>rt that evidence of medical standards ought to haYe 
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been receiv·ed from a doctor or doctors called as expert 
medical witnesses. This has already been discussed by 
defendant in the argument under the preceding point 
wherein the general rule set forth in the case of Fredrick-
son vs. Maw ~waR discussed. 
Defendants Request No. 8, although marked by the 
trial court as ''covered" was not given, even in part. 
This Request, in substance, would have: instructed the 
jury that the plaintiff, to sustain her burden of proof, 
was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the injury allegedly suffered by her would not have 
occurred without neglect by the defendant, and that plain-
tiff "~ould not satisfy that burden of proof unless she 
showed that the result would probably have been differ-
ent had the defendant acted with due care. 
Failure to give this Request deprived defendant of 
one of the theories of his defense. The theory was based 
upon the rule to be draiYn from the prevjously discussed 
case of Anderson vs. Nixon, 139 P. (2d) at page 220. It 
will be recalled that that case involved osteomyelitis and 
the effect of blood transfusions on the progress of that 
disease. There was no evidence that if the defendant doc-
tor had given blood transfusions the end result would 
have been avoided. This constituted a fatal defect in the 
ca:;:p, according to the opinion of this Court. 
Defendant's Request ~ o. 15 set forth the defendant's 
theory that he could not be held responsible for any in-
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jury of plaintiff which resulted from the failure of due 
care of hospital personnel, unless and until some fact 
occurred .by which he knew, or should have known, that 
the orders he had given were not being followed and that 
he thereafter failed to take -corrective measures and that 
as a result of such failure plaintiff was injured. 
The trial court marked upon this Request the words 
In ink "·substance covered." 
Later while the jury was in deliberation there was 
written by the court, in pencil, the words "should pro-
bably have been given". We submit the r·eason for 1the 
latter comment was that the court's instruction No. 19, 
which attempted to cover the matters contained in this 
Request, failed to apply the principal of proximate causa-
tion to this theory of defense, and thus failed to present 
completely one of the theories upon which defendant had 
relied. 
Although defendant's answer was amended by leave 
of ·court, asked and obtained at pre-trial, to include the 
defense of contributory negligence, the court refused 
to give defendant's Request No. 17, which set forth 
another theory of defense. Although there had been 
considerable empha~i~ placed by defendant upon the 
plaintiff's failure to follow the recon1mendations of Dr. 
McAllister and Dr. Hicken on August 17. 19 and 20, 
1954, which rerommendations '"ere to the effect that 
plaintiff ought to return to tlH' hospital, the court re-
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fused this request with the comment "outside issues". 
This was an apparent inadvertence on the part of the 
trial court since defendant's answer contains, upon the 
margin of the first page, this notation by the trial judge: 
"Deft. permitted to amend to include ·contributory". 
It will be noted that the Request concerning contri-
butory negligence sought merely to mitigate damage::; 
to the extent that if the jury found that plaintiff had 
failed to follow her doctor's recommendation, she would 
not be entitled to any sum for damages suffered frmn 
that time forward. 
Defendant's Request No. 19 was tendered for the 
purpose of informing the jury that it should not consider 
Dr. I-Iicken 's conduct alone on this case, but should 
consider the conduct of his associate doctors, and if such 
doctors failed in their duty toward plaintiff, such failure 
would be chargeable to the defendant, but if they assisted 
in the performance of such duty, such assistance would 
be to the benefit of the defendant and could be considered 
by the jury as if defendant himself had performed such 
acts. 
This theory was in accord with the understanding 
reached by the court and counsel upon the pre-trial 
hearing and was the theory upon which the case was 
tried to the jury, even though plaintiff continually em-
phasized the alleged failure of Dr. I-Iicken personally 
to visit or treat plaintiff. 
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The theory was mentioned by the court in its In-
struction 17, wherein the jury was instructed concerning 
the method of determining a proper standard of medical 
care. The court began that Instruction by stating "In 
determining whether the defendant and the other doctors 
associated with him properly fufilled the duties imposed 
upon them.'' 
Plaintiff did not except to this Instruction and it 
was noted that throughout the trial plaintiff was per-
fectly willing to follow this theory of ''doctors in asso-
ciation" whenever it best suited her purpose. 
Failure to give this instruction constituted preju-
dicial error, which was spe-cifically recognized by the 
trial court jn his decision at the end of the case (R. 362). 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR SUB-
STANTIALLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, IN 
RECEIVING EVIDENCE REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
PHYSICAL CONDITION, AND MEDICAL TREATMENT 
AFFORDED HER IN THE STATE OF WYOMING FOLLOW-
ING AUGUST 20, 1954, AND RELATING TO HER PHYSICAL 
CONDITION SINCE HER RETURN FROM WYOMING, BE-
CAUSE NONE OF SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRECEDED BY 
A PROPER FOUNDATION SHOWING A CAUSAL RE-
LATION WITH ANY ACT OR OMISSION CHARGED 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
rrhe evidence to which defendant objects and which 
wn~ l'('('f'lVPd erroneon~ly consisted of exhibits relating 
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to charges for medical care and hospitalization claimed 
by plaintiff to have been incurred in Rawlins, Wyoming, 
following her departure from Salt Lake City. There was 
no proper foundation for this evidence. 
There was no showing of the nature of plaintiff'~ 
ailment which required treatment or hospitalization and 
no evidence that the expenses were attributable to any 
act or omission upon the part of the defendant. 
The evidence was also improperly received because 
it was not submitted by any testimony that the charges 
made by the Wyoming doctors and hospital were reason-
able or reasonably necessary. 
Further, the court erroneously received evidence con-
cerning alleged loss of earnings and earning power on 
the part of the plaintiff during a seventeen month 
period following her departure from Salt Lake City. 
The jury was instructed concerning these claims in th8 
court's Instructions 22 and 23, but there was no evidence 
of any kind from which a jury would properly have found 
that plaintiff had had an impairment of earning power 
or loss of earnings ·caused by or resulting from any 
act or omission on the part of the defendant. 
Defendant believes that the reception of such evi-
dence by the court was prejudicial. The trial court 
agreed, stating: " ... reception of that evidence in the 
record was error-very prejudicial in its nature-because 
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it left the way open to inferences, presumption of fact 
and conclusions without any proper basis therefor, and 
there is no evidence that the expenses incurred were 
incurred in ·connection with, or as a result of anything 
involved in the action which was on trial here in court." 
(R. 361, 362). 
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT 
We believe, as did the trial judge, that plaintiff 
failed to establish actionable negligence. Should the 
Supreme Court disagree, we submit that the Court should 
not reinstate the jury verdict and direct entry of judg-
ment, for the effect of the errors described in the fore-
going Additional Argument was to deprive the defen-
dant of his fundamental right to a fair and impartial 
trial, and, under such circumstances, defendant is en-
titled, as a matter of law, to a new trial, where such 
errors, clearly recognized by the trial court, would not 
be likely to recur. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, "TORSLEY. SXO\Y & 
CHRISTENSEN and JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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